N. Muthu Mohan

If one looks at the history of Indian philosophy, he or she can find that at various historical stages Indian philosophical schools had conducted intensive debates and combats among themselves. One can be reminded of the long contests and disputes between the Buddhists and Vedic schools or the debates among the Vedic schools themselves. These debates were of traditional type. After the advent of English in India, Indian philosophy has got exposed to the European forms of critical reflection and this has added a new dimension to the already existing types of interactions among philosophical schools.

However, one cannot be very much satisfied about the state of open discussions and debates in modern Indian philosophy. Indian philosophers, may be due to the awareness of the colonial and neocolonial situations, or due to the modern mobilizations of religious identities, have also developed a type of immune or resistance to critical reflection. We cannot say for sure that there are enough discussions occurring at the interest of search for truth in philosophy. On the other hand, often our philosophers are directed by vested interests of defending their own school of thought by non-philosophical means.

Despite the above said background prevailing in Indian philosophy, there are certain compelling trends, often conditioned by the development of socio-cultural movements, in favor of cultivating critical studies of Indian philosophy too. The Marxist interpretation of Indian philosophy is one such trend in the reading of Indian philosophy from a critical perspective. Rahul Sankrityayan, K.Damodharan and Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya are the prominent thinkers in this school. The Periyarian and Dravidian reading of Indian philosophy, often in the form of critically looking into Hinduism is popular in this region of the country.

Similar regional versions of reading Indian philosophy are available in other parts of the country too. I can witness the Sikh reading of Indian philosophy popular among the academies of Punjab. Islamic and Christian readings of Indian philosophy are well earlier and richer even to this. In recent times the Dalit pespective of evaluating Indian philosophy is gaining new grounds although this trend started from Mahatma Phule and Ambedkar. Equally rewarding would be a feminist reading of Indian philosophy.

Postmodernism is one of the recent trends in Western philosophy, broadly in Western culture studies that have brought to focus a few considerable critical tools in the studies of philosophy. Postmodernism became popular in Western thought in the 1980s. As its name indicates, postmodernism has certain continuities with as well discontinuities from the Modernism that is associated with such literary thinkers as T.S.Eliot, D.H.Lawrence, Mathew Arnold, Kafka and Camus. To a philosopher, Modernism is a literary phenomenon that reflected many of the philosophical problems associated with the Phenomenological and Existentialist movements in philosophy.

To put it very briefly, Phenomenological and Existential philosophies registered the deep crisis of Western society in the 20th century, more particularly the social and cultural crisis related with the two world wars in Europe. Phenomenology and Existentialism addressed to the human situation in this technocratic and crisis-bound society and they tried to evoke the authentic human existence to speak for itself. Postmodernism inherits this crisis situation of Modernism but at the same time it is critical to the theme of subjectivity made so central by Phenomenology and Existentialism. Postmodernism does not limit itself by defining its attitude only to the Modernist movement. It goes further.

It moves to criticize the values and slogans of the entire Modernity in Europe that was led by the Enlightenment movement and science oriented philosophies. It declares that the Modern European society has constructed certain Grand Narratives such as humanity, progress, reason and social liberation, and calls to problematize them. The Heideggerian theme of onto-theological bias of Western metaphysics has been re-articulated by the Postmodernists with fresh vigor and renewed rigor.

Derrida takes up this problem to the ancient Greek philosophy which offered the first formulation of logocentrism in Philosophy. Derrida's approach brings to our focus that the problem is not merely with modernity but Postmodernism is actually engaged with a fundamental civilizational criticism. We understand that postmodernism is a philosophy of cultural politics that is aimed at deconstructing the structures and patterns programmed in culture and language, in ways of life, for that matter, in any sign system. Postmodernism, at this stage, looks like a criticism of not only the European Modernity but also the Pre-modernity that conditioned the civilizational values of Modernity too.

Now, let us pass over to Indian philosophy. In Indian context any Postmodern exercise can not limit itself with mere repetition of the postmodernist criticisms of scientistic and rationalist discourses of Modernity only. After all, Indian Modernity itself is an immature phenomenon mostly conditioned by the colonial and neo-colonial background of recent Indian history. The traditional philosophical and religious discourses are very much alive here and a postmodern discussion cannot avoid problematizing the pre-modern themes.

Consequently, postmodernism encounters in India not modernity or modernism as its objects of criticism, but more it has to look into the pre-modern philosophical and cultural themes. This means that we have to look into the way grand narratives were constructed in ancient Indian culture and philosophy, and the way how they were displayed in the consequent history of society.

Let us start this discussion from clarifying the idea of grand narrative and the way postmodernism perceives this concept. For postmodernism, grand narratives are the most abstract concepts that exclude the actual complexities of reality. A grand narrative clears itself from differences, multiplicity, identities, contradictions and changes identifiable and occurring in the so-called phenomenal world.

Construction of a grand narrative introduces certain evaluative scales into the discussion and in the final analysis attributes certain ideological stigmas upon the excluded moments of reality. Thus, an asymmetrical binary is constructed where one side of the binary is always higher than the other side. Such a hierarchical construction is an ideological act, according to postmodernism. Construction of a grand narrative in this manner has a persuasive power which is exercises almost with the consent of the items involved.

The concept of Brahman in the Upanishads can serve as a best example of a grand narrative in the present context of our discussion. In the early Upanishads, the question of 'what is Brahman' is raised again and again by the Upanishadic thinkers and innumerable answers are sought in the course of the discussions. One is astounded by the analytical aptitude of the Upanishadic discussants. And what is most interesting is that, along with the increasing analytical exercise of the Upanishadic thinkers, the attempt to abstract Brahman from the analytical moments too increases. The analytical activity brings to focus more and more new sides of the reality. Thus the reality becomes more and more complicated. All those complexities are dug out of the reality with the help of observation and analysis.

However, a specialized and motivated trend is there in the Upanishads to abstract away the concept of Brahman from the complexities identified. Brahman is abstracted away from every thing gross, physical and compared more and more to subtle things like prana or akash. Brahman is compared to the undifferentiated basal sound of 'oum'. A methodology of reduction is performed to strengthen the abstraction of Brahman. Brahman is compared to the water of the ocean against the tides of waves appearing in the ocean. It is compared to the clay from which various pots of clay are made out. Brahman is also compared to the copper metal from which the copper ornaments are carved out. This is the way of constructing a grand narrative. Differentiations and complexities are shed down from a grand narrative.

A grand narrative always refuses to hold in itself the concreteness of reality. Let us remind here the Hegelian discussion of abstraction and concreteness. A grand narrative prefers to fly away from the concreteness of reality. Parmenedes in Greek philosophy preferred to move away from opinions to abstract truths. Aristotle desired to avoid contradictions in correct thinking. Descartes wanted to reach beyond doubt self-clear ideas. The Upanishadic philosophy too tries to reach Brahman beyond multiplicity, divisibility, physical and contradictory. Evaluative appellations too are added to the concept of Brahman. Brahman is ancient, the first, the sacred and the eternal. Brahman is also the one.

And what about the other side that stands against the Brahman? It is the phenomenal world, its multiplicity, divisibility and physical nature. It is transient. It is temporal. It undergoes change. You can name it Prakriti. Although Prakriti as nature is one, its oneness is not at all stressed in principle. Prakriti evolves and gives birth to so many things. Once Prakrati evolves, the attribute of eternality can not be ascribed to it. In Sankhya philosophy, the original or natural state of Prakriti is said to be pralaya. There is a space for feminist reading too here. Prakriti as earth as well as woman give birth to, divide into, evolve into multiple. Thus the Prakriti is transient. In that sense it is not eternal.

Consequently, Prakriti is not truth eternal. Prakriti is the opposite of Brahman. The Upanishadic philosophy completes itself in terms of the construction of these binaries that are hierarchical, asymmetrical. Along with the analytical categories of one/multiple, one/divisible, eternal/transient etc, so many evaluative or ideological categories too mix up into the analysis namely the multiple as chaotic, superficial, impure, phenomenal, mayic etc.

The peak of Upanishadic wisdom is said to be the definition of Brahman as Neti, Neti. Similarly the definition that the Brahman is Nirprapanca, Nirvacanya, Nirguna and Nirakara. Every thing earthly, temporal and attributive has been thoroughly excluded from the concept of Brahman. Brahman in such a state is absolute. It is an absolute grand narrative. Every thing earthly, temporal and attributive has been cast off from the concept of Brahman. As much as the binary of Brahman and Prakriti is ideological, its status can not be changed by any other means. As much as the binary of Brahman and Prakriti is religious, its absolute nature becomes unchangeable. Brahman and Prakriti do not interact, do not relate one to the other, do not penetrate each other, do not touch each other. Their mutual exclusion becomes a law, an ideological law, an eternal law, a sanatana law.

The construction of Brahman as a grand narrative suppresses temporality. Temporality is change, modification. Brahman does not have any mode. It does not undergo change. It keeps the time thoroughly outside of itself. Allowing temporality or change may mean Brahman inviting its own death. It is against the rules of the game of constructing a grand narrative. Brahman suppressing thoroughly temporality is like conceiving pure spatiality that too like the transparent and indivisible space of the sky.

Not only the Time has been suppressed, but along with that a galaxy of items, namely differences, identities, multiplicity, their autonomy, the feminine, the physical etc are suppressed out from the grand narrative of Brahman. In the construction of the grand narrative of Brahman, even discursive thought as reflection too is suppressed. The Gnana or knowledge achieved at the stage of realizing the Brahman is not equivalent to the discursive or logical thought. It is beyond it. The karmas or the rituals that were celebrated otherwise in the early Vedic literature too are suppressed now in favor of constructing the concept of Brahman. Karma as action of any type has also been placed outside the concept of Brahman.

Along with the suppression of temporality, the philosophy of Brahman suppresses also the temporal subjectivity. It is her appears the concept of Atman as the transcendental subjectivity. In the philosophy of Brahman, one finds altogether two concepts of subjectivity namely the Atman proper and the other the temporal self that are made into binaries. They too are ordered in hierarchy as levels of Paramarthika and Vyavakarika. The Paramarthika Atman is realized after deconstructing the Vyavakarika self. The Vyavakarika self is associated with the temporal knowledge, mind, senses, body and finally with the world. The Paramarthika Atman is equivalent to the spiritual or the religious where as the vyavakarika self is comparable to the temporal and earthly ego. The philosophy of Brahman ultimately affirms the supremacy of the Atman over the temporal ego.

At times, the Upanishads declare that only the Atman is real while the temporal ego is transient. What is the meaning of this binary and the elevation of one over the other? It can be understood as the affirmation of religious power over the temporal power. Spiritual legitimacy and supremacy have been earned to the concept of Atman discarding the temporal power as the lower. In the ancient Indian social context, the binary of Atman and temporal self can also be read as the contest of Brahman power over the kshatriya power. After all, during the period of Mahabharata and Ramayana the said contest was an actual one and towards the end of the Itihas the problem was solved in favor of Brahman by reasserting its supremacy over the temporal one.

There are at least two significant ancient Indian philosophical concepts that vehemently challenge the overwhelming dominance of Brahman and its grand narrative status. They are the Jaina concept of Anekanta and the Vaisesika concept of Visesa. Anekanta vada of Jainism seems to be the direct opposition to the Ekanta vada of Brahman. If Ekanta vada can be translated as the philosophy of aloneness asserting the self-assumed supremacy of the concept of Nirguna Brahman against the multi-gunic reality, then Anekanta vada can be translated as the philosophy of multiplicity or as the philosophy of differences affirming the authenticity and autonomy of the atomic reality and individualized standpoints about that reality.

“Each living and non-living being or atom, and the infinite number of living beings is a cluster of infinite qualities and their modifications. So even if all these i.e. the whole truth were comprehended by the Omniscients, it was impossible to be expressed in words. And hence, the whole truth has to be seen at, and stated in infinite ways of expression”. Let us therefore, “look at this ocean of anekanta, i.e. the principle of innumerable points of view with peace and solemnity and have respect of other’s points of view, since they also hold and express partial truths” (Pt. Mahendrakumara Nyayacharya, Jainadarshana, Pp. 4,5,36-42).

Anekanta vada as the philosophy of multiplicity is in so many aspects closer to some postulates of even postmodernism. It is worth here to note that Post modern philosophy is often identified as a standpoint of pluralistic nominalism. Anekanta vada as an epistemological conception justifies differing perceptions about the nature of reality, every one perceiving the world from his own existential situation.

“All absolutist (ekantika) attitudes (nayas) are false; and therefore their collection is also false. Non-absolutist (Anekantika) attitudes are correct. Therefore all of them being meaningful (in the expression and representation of some aspect of truth); their collection is not false” (Aptamimamsa, V .108). You cannot avoid conflicting assessments about reality when there are conflicting social groups live and struggle for their interests in the society. Consequently, there are so many varying constructions or readings of the world. Every one perception or interpretation is as real as the other. Anekanta vada also suggests a non-violent relationship among the differing and varying points of view. It is the ethics of Ahimsa proposed by Jainism.

I shall be inclined to translate the term ahimsa as non-killing, non-violence, even as non-interference, non-dominance and non-coercive attitude to the other. “This attitude of Jainism is more due to its rational consciousness, than emotional compassion. It is not based on superficial or imposed social fellow feeling, but on individual responsibility. Jainism presumes infinite capacity for spiritual progress in every soul. What is needed is complete non-interference from outside. Given the freedom of development, everyone is bound to progress. Interference means spiritual dragging. Truth is not to be forced, it is only to be preached” explains V.P.Jain. (V.P.Jain. The Notion of Dharma in Jainism: A comparative View in the Book Glimpses of Jainism ed. Surender K.Jain. MLBD, Delhi. 1997. P.120).

Ahimsa appears as the ethics of a pluralistic federative democracy, as voluntary commitment of people of one sort to respect the point of view of the people of another sort. We have no right to kill the viewpoint of another as long as it emerges from their interests and stands for their identity. No concept has the right to dominate the other in the name of more essentiality ascribed to that concept. Postmodernism maintains that all types of essentialism and attempts of transcending the so called phenomenal are in the path of constructing grand narratives for dominance.

Another equally interesting concept in Indian philosophy that speaks for difference and multiplicity is the concept of Visesa. Visesa is literally specificity, particularity and individuality. It can imply multiplicity and differences. Logically Visesa is that which gives definition to a thing or event against the background of the relation of generality the thing or event may have with other things and events. Visesa is also the identity of the thing or event. Visesa as the distinctive feature of the thing always resists to reduce the thing into something else whatever you call it as essence, cause or general.

Visesa demands autonomy to existence of that particular phenomenon. Visesa insists upon the svabhava of that phenomenon. Visesa differs categorically from the regressive methodology of reduction followed for the making of the concept of Brahman. It is progressively for the new that is emerging and for its specificity and assertion. Absolutizing the concept of Visesa, one can call it as the philosophy of pluralistic nominalism.

We identify here that the problematic of one and many occupies the core place in ancient Indian philosophy. It is a philosophical debate, may be also a social debate, between Ekanta vada and Anekanta vada, a debate between the supremacy of Brahman and the autonomy of multiplicity. In Postmodern terminology, this may be the problem of disciplining the multiplicity, bringing the many under order and hierarchizing the many under the leadership of the Brahman, the one supreme.

Let me continue to think over the arguments available in Indian philosophy that preferred to differ from the philosophy of Brahman as a grand narrative and as a totalizing structure.

Possibly, two more powerful arguments sneak into the scene namely the Samkya and the Buddhist. Both the arguments try to mediate between the extremes of one and many already articulated and suggest their own ways out. Samkhya proposes an evolutionary paradigm where Prakriti, the one dynamic beginning gives birth to so many evolutes, thus trying to embrace the many in the form of a concrete-abstraction. Neither the Time, nor the many are suppressed in the Samkhyan frame. Parinama or a chronologically organized change is employed in constructing the concrete-abstraction of the Samkhya school. Prakriti is a richer concept than the Brahman, a pure abstraction.

At no time, the Prakriti is without the gunas or their interaction. Prakriti in the Samkhya and Tantric versions includes the affluent spontaneity of Nature. Prakriti is feminine and Mahamaya. Prakriti is one but its oneness is never stressed at all in Samkhya philosophy. It seems that the unpredictable spontaneity and uncontrollable dynamism of Prakriti are tamed and dociled by the systematization of Samkhya. In terms of a rigorous Postmodernism, the concept of Prakriti too can be named as a grand narrative.

However, it has to be reminded that the blurring boundaries between Samkhya and Tantrism give us a scope to invoke at any time the spontaneity of the original untamed Prakriti. The classification and hierarchization of gunas into satva, rajas and tamas is another problematic area where we find the Samkhya thought has gone under an editorial work to serve the purposes of the Ekanta vada. In such areas one can identify the concept of Brahman-supremacy intended to interact with the concrete-abstraction of Samkhya and the later made to serve the former.

The second important argument that enters midway into the debate between Ekanta vada and Anekanta vada is the concept of Buddhism. Buddhism declares that it is a madhya marga, a middle path. The concept of middle path of Buddhism has so many explanations as middle path between self-mortification and sensualism, as middle path between existence and non-existence, eternity and non-eternity, self and non-self etc. Without excluding the rich meanings attributed to the concept, it is also a middle path between Ekanta vada and Anekanta vada. The idea of middle path itself is interesting in the sense that in the realm of the middle nothing is fixed and frozen. The strength of the middle is that it excludes the extremes.

Once the extremes are excluded, you have only the dialogic realm in between. We continue to operate with the extreme concepts but only as a way of explanation. The middle in terms of the extremes is the meeting point of the opposites. The total picture of the philosophy of the middle is directed against the methodology followed by the earlier philosophical schools, namely to reach out the ultimate substance either at this end or at that end. The earlier schools were engaged by all means to dichotomize the reality and to declare the other as illusion or irrelevant. On the other hand, the middle path is an attempt to synthesize, to bring the opposites together and make them interact. The extremes could be expressed in the form of finished concepts where as their interactions are non-concepts.

Interestingly Buddhism is a philosophy of non-concepts. In the context of the postmodern discussion we are trying to make out, I would remind that post modernism too claims that it is a philosophy of non-concepts. Buddhism's concern is not to produce more closed concepts but to break open the existing concepts for interactions. It is a realm of flux where nothing is permanent. It is a realm of criticism and re-criticism. It is re-criticism because nothing should be allowed to freeze. It is the realm of dialectics where things and concepts appear in their mode of change. In this fluid state, no ready-made solutions are offered but you are only asked to reflect upon the possibilities in the concrete situations. You are called to be aware of the complexities and advised to work out alternatives.

Quite relevant here is the doctrine of Pratitya Samutpada that is translated as the doctrine of dependent origination or chain of causation or as the law of universal interrelationship. May be, it can also be translated just as the law of relatedness. Things are related and they are transient. No thing has a thorough individuality. No thing has an absolute unchangeable identity. No thing is a thing in itself. It always stretches out. Interactions and modifications are the only real. Every boundary is transcended, every identity shifts its margins. The reality is never a closed one. It always opens itself to the other.

Often it is said that Buddhism is a philosophy of the phenomenal world. It is not very much true. Buddhism may discard the classification as Paramarthika and Vyavakarika, and it may prefer to remain in the middle, bringing together the two to interpenetrate. It would speak about the anitya of not only the temporal plane but also the anitya of the so called Paramarthika level. In the polemic context of the philosophy of Brahman, Buddhism ought to be specifically directed against the nitya or permanence so overwhelmingly claimed by the Brahman.

Another formulation of Pratitya Samutpada is the doctrine of Anatma vada. It states that there is no soul in itself as well as there is no thing in itself. The theme of relatedness has been affirmed once again. There is nothing in things as well as in human beings which can be called one's own, nothing substantial, nothing permanent. Buddhism deconstructs subjectivity but deconstructs it thoroughly. It does not deconstruct subjectivity at the temporal level and keeps it untouched for the Paramarthika level. The deconstruction is total here. Even the question of identity is challenged here.

Buddhism contributes to the theme of multiple identities or shifting of identities. In Buddhism one can not go for constructing asymmetrical binaries of soul and body, sacred and profane, Brahman and Maya. Buddhism empties the concept of Atman as well as the mind. It does not speak of mind but speaks only of states of consciousness. Buddism is another version of the philosophy of concrete abstraction. Interactions and contradictions, as well as their implications in human beings have been attracted into the fold of conceptualization in Buddhism. Buddhism is a strong statement against the totalitarian and idealistic Ekanta vada and it is also more realistic than the philosophical nominalism of Anekanta vada.

One can continue this discussion on Buddhism exploring the critical potentialities of the school. It is unnecessary to elaborate the theme any longer in an auditorium of experts of Indian philosophy. I can only name a few more concepts such as Sunyata, Kshanika vada, Sahaja etc to indicate Buddhism's further potentials.

What was the path of the philosophy of Brahman in the further course of Indian history? I think the philosophy of Vedanta moves in the direction of meeting the new developments in Indian philosophy. The Shramanic conceptions of Karma, suffering, anitya, anatmavada and the Samkhya concept of guna etc undergo fundamental rethinking in the quarters of Vedanta philosophy. The main strategy of Vedanta seems to be limited and selected usage of the terms according to the needs of retaining the supremacy of the concept of Brahman.

It is for this purpose a clear dichotomy of two levels namely Paramarthika and Vyavakarika are constructed by Vedanta. Karma, Dukha, anitya, anatma or gunas are attributed to the realm of Vyavakarika and Brahman is thoroughly shifted to the realm of Paramarthika. And, more importantly, the relation between the two realms are also formulated now. By constructing an asymmetrical relation between the two realms, the philosophy of Vedanta thoroughly colonizes the so called temporal realm.

The colonization of temporal world by the concept of Brahman is achieved, for example, by a theme so popular in Indian philosophy, namely the theme of Mukti or liberation. The carrier or agent of mukti in the philosophy of Vedanta is the Atman, the anthropocentric residue that is presupposed at the Paramarthika level. The rich Buddhist psychology and the equally rich yogic physiology and psychology are now undermined to the rule of Atman. The construction is total and dedicated to all minutest details. The transient and multiple temporal reality is negated to achieve Atman-realization.

Indian philosophical process dominantly prefers the path of internal colonization. By the term internal colonization I mean the colonization of near and immediate objects, territories and spaces. Internal colonization is colonizing the personal space or private space. This means that philosophical totalizing and construction of grand narratives are projected in anthropological frames. The immediate and near objects for atman are buddhi, manas, indhriyas and body. Atman colonizes its immediate objects.

Colonization and disciplining the many continues in the Bhakti movements too. In Bhakti, the entire private sphere as well as the domestic sphere is colonized. The body, the living abode, the little village are colonized. Celestial weddings, Divine Family and Bridal Mysticism are key components of the Bhakti culture. Absolute voluntary surrender is the relationship mostly advocated by Bhakti. Bhakti succeeded in spiritualizing the secular and temporal realms of life.

Let us end our discussion with a question, what is the way out? What are the ways, may be, Postmodernism suggests to counter the totalizing grand narrative of Brahman?

In place of totalitarian and grand narratives, post modernism suggests multiple, localized, autonomised and non-centralized kinds of theoretical production “whose validity is not dependent on the approval of the established regimes of thought”. Foucault calls this “the return of knowledge” or better “the insurrection of subjugated knowledges”. By subjugated knowledges, Foucault refers to “a whole set of knowledges that have been disqualified as inadequate to their task or insufficiently elaborated.

Foucault contends that the historical contents of these knowledges contain in themselves “the ruptural effects of conflict and struggle” that were masked by the tyranny of globalizing discourses with their hierarchy and all their privileges of theorization. In other words, Foucault suggests to rediscover the historical knowledge of struggles, the memory of hostile encounters which even up to this day have been confined to the margins of knowledge. Foucault calls this the alternative geneology, rather a multiplicity of genealogical researches which are aimed at a painstaking rediscovery of struggles together with rude memory of their conflicts.

The anekanta of Jainism, Visesa of Vaisesika and the anitya of Buddhism need to be insurrected for the above purpose.


Copyright©2004 N. Muthu Mohan. About the author