Dwane Allen

"He who can does. He who cannot teaches". This is a statement that many people believe about the teaching profession. This adage infers that one decides to teach only after having failed in the world of economic achievement. Unlike sports, business, or law, the educational field does not produce significant monetary gains or immediate successes. On the contrary, by stimulating a zest for learning, educators perform their greatest services to and receive their greatest achievements from, those whom they have trained, such as the athletes, businessmen, and lawyers of tomorrow. Because teaching is challenging and often carries with it expectations from multiple stakeholders (i.e. administrators, parents, and legislators), teacher burnout and stress related problems are a reality for a significant part of the workforce (Ehrenberg, & Brewer, 1994).

Are the stresses of meeting expectations from multiple stakeholders and burnout the primary contributors to this so-called teacher shortage and high teacher turnover rate? According to Ingersoll (2002), the nation is far from experiencing a teacher shortage. He reports that the nation, per capita, actually has a surplus of teachers; the only shortage of teachers is found in our poor communities and in certain concentrations, such as special education, bilingual education, math, and science.

Understanding this phenomenon is essential to understanding and meeting the mandate in the No Child Left Behind Act (U.S. Department of Education, 2002), which requires that all teachers be highly qualified in the subjects they teach by the year 2006. Were there an overall shortage of teachers, the No Child Left Behind Act might be illogical. However, because it is not an overall teacher shortage that plagues public education, but rather a quality issue, there is indeed logic to No Child Left Behind provisions that should appeal to those who care about the welfare of economically disadvantaged students. The degree to which special education teachers have to meet the highly qualified teacher requirement is being addressed at the national level by the re-authorization of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). Special education teachers would not have to meet the highly qualified teacher definition of NCLB and demonstrate subject matter competence when services are delivered where the special education teacher (U.S. Department of Education, 2002):

. teaches as a member of a team where another teacher has demonstrated subject matter competence in the core academic subject being team taught.

. delivers special instructional assistance within the classroom where the core academic subject is taught.

. provides consultation services to a highly qualified teacher of core academics subjects.

Nevertheless, as No Child Left Behind provisions are implemented and the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) is reauthorized, the best policy for hiring special education teachers is to hire the most qualified.

As the provisions of No Child Left Behind are implemented and the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act reauthorization lurks, school districts must decide upon the best method to resolve the fact that more than 12,000 special education teaching positions are left unfilled nationwide and 10% of special education teachers that do fill the positions lack the expertise to be truly effective in special education (Hill, 2001). Addressing these issues means that, instead of asking generic questions about how to get more teachers, stakeholders must figure out how to attract and retain more good teachers overall - particularly in high-need schools and subjects. Thus the conundrum is that teachers are compensated and perceived by society as para-professionals, yet they are held accountable by legislators and administrators to perform at a professional level, but are given limited autonomy within the power structure.

My position is that teaching in the public school system is not treated as a professional career; this is apparent from the less than competitive compensation, benefits, limited autonomy, and high turnover rate (See Table 1. Teacher Compensation Survey). In order to retain competent teachers and be in compliance with No Child Left Behind, along with the possible new hiring provisions under IDEA, districts must revamp their human resource policies in the areas of compensation, benefits, recruitment, and incentives.

The negative effects on schools and students due to teachers leaving the profession have been the focus of many recent studies (Kaplan & Owings, 2002, & Sanders, W., & Rivers, J. 2000). These studies found that high rates of teacher turnover play a significant role in teacher shortages and out-of-field teaching, with a disproportionate effect on high-poverty schools. For example, an analysis using data from the National Assessment of Educational Progress found that in math and science, students whose teachers majored or minored in the content area in which they teach outperform their peers by 40% of a grade level (Weglinksy, 2000).

There is equally compelling evidence, however, that a substantial percentage of students are taught by teachers who lack training or knowledge in the subjects they teach. In a study performed by Jerald & Ingersoll (2002), it was discovered that nearly one fourth of the core academic classes at the secondary level nationwide are taught by teachers lacking even a minor in their respective subject; this number includes more than one third of core academic classes in high-poverty schools. These findings suggest that mandating that all teachers demonstrate content area knowledge is a significant, but challenging goal.

Although substantive learning effects are important, equally important, is the fiscal effect on districts when teachers leave. By having a reliable estimate of teacher turnover costs, districts can more adequately assess the effect of such turnover, as well as examine the cost-effectiveness of implementing intervention strategies designed to reduce turnover, such as compensation and benefits plans that reflect teachers’ experience levels, and aggressive recruitment plans that provides higher compensation.

Rather than examine the classroom effect of teachers leaving the profession, some studies (Brannick, 1999, and Benner, 2000) have used models typically found in the corporate environment for estimating the costs of employee turnover and applied these methods to school districts. Texas Center for Educational Research (2000) looked at one of the most conservative model estimates of turnover costs at a percentage of an employee's wages and benefits (typically 25-30 percent). Using this method, it was estimated that, in 1999, the cost to Texas school systems for the loss of each teacher ranged from $8,231 for a teacher with no experience, to $13,122 for a teacher with 20 years of experience. The average cost turned out to be $11,120.

Brannick (1999) utilized another model and attempted to quantify district expenses through detailed analysis of actual district costs (obtained from interviews and district supplied expense data). The researcher looked at separation costs, hiring costs, and training costs in three districts (two large urban areas outside of central cities-and one small rural area). Two of the districts had a higher turnover rate than the state average, while one district faced a lower turnover rate. Using this model, the turnover costs were found to vary widely by district, from $3,367 to $5,166 per teacher. Utilizing these estimates with an industry model, Brannick (1999) recommended a turnover cost estimate of 20 percent of each leaving teacher's annual salary. Therefore, if the average salary for teachers in Texas is $38,359 and we are hiring 20,000 new teachers a year, it is a conservative estimate that each year we are spending hundreds of millions of dollar due to turnover. Statewide, researchers (Benner, 2000) estimated that the teacher turnover rate costs Texas schools between $329 million per year and $1.59 billion per year. Benner (2000) recommended addressing the issue by implementing strategies designed to increase teacher retention and reduce turnover.

Some argue that the obvious solution is to raise pay for all teachers (Grissmer and Kirby 1992, and Hauenstein, 1999). With a national average annual salary of only about $43,000, teaching does not compare favorably with other professional opportunities available to talented individuals (National Education Association Research, 2002). Higher non-education salaries in the local area can also persuade teachers to leave their vocation for other jobs. However, while there is widespread agreement that good teachers deserve to be paid more, simply raising teacher pay across the board will not solve the allocation problem and will likely not put a serious dent in the adverse selection problem.

Maslow (1970) puts forth probably the best known theory that can be applied to this predicament. This theory postulates that human behavior is influenced by an individual’s unsatisfied needs. Maslow hypothesizes that human needs are ordinal in nature and can be classified in a dependent hierarchy. From bottom to top of this hierarchy, Maslow explains that humans cannot fulfill higher needs until lower needs are met. Further, this theory states that to motivate individuals, the unmet needs must be identified and met (Maslow, 1970). The very first stage of this hierarchy is the safety needs. These are concerned with the physical maintenance of the individual such as shelter and protection from physical harm. When applying this theory to the teacher turnover phenomenon, this theory indicates that unless teachers are paid enough to have a home, a car, and all the basic necessities of life, they will be unsatisfied.

Maslow’s theory fits well with economic theories of employment and the findings of contemporary researchers who find that pay does matter (Murnane and Olsen 1990; Hauenstein, 1999). Although salary alone is not sufficient to predict teacher turnover, it does attest to the quality of teachers attracted and their subsequent quantity (Hauenstein, 1999). For a teacher to be satisfied with their wages, he or she must be receiving compensation that is reasonable to the local mean. Thus a teacher who makes $35,000 annually can live reasonably well in an area where the mean income is around the same level. In areas such as the Dallas and Fort Worth Metroplex, where the average wage is much higher, it is more difficult for a teacher to cover basic living expenses at $38,000 annually.

Although the No Child Left Behind program was formed with the intention of employing high quality teachers in all schools by 2006, high-poverty schools have the most difficult challenge in attracting and retaining qualified teachers. Because teaching in such schools is more demanding, many teachers who do so are likely to transfer to less demanding, more affluent schools when given the option or opportunity (Hanushek, 1996). This situation is particularly troubling because research suggests that disadvantaged students' achievements are especially sensitive to and dependent upon the quality of their teachers (Sanders & Rivers, 1996). Persuading skilled teachers to accept and remain in these positions requires not only increasing their pay but also making teaching assignments in high-poverty schools sufficiently more remunerative in relation to other teaching positions. Likewise, addressing the shortage of qualified math and science teachers will require compensation policies to reflect the market realities of more highly paid options available to these teachers in other fields.

In order to corroborate findings from the literature, a survey research design was utilized to obtain information from twenty volunteers. The goal of the survey was to explore factors that would improve recruiting strategies and reduce teacher turnover. The data for this study consisted of college seniors from the University of Dallas majoring in education in addition to teachers in the Lewisville School District with one to three, four to seven, and seven or more years of teaching experience. The participants were asked to rate dimensions according to a Likert Scale of one to five, with one being the most important and five being the least important. The survey was designed to capture information relating to dimensions that are important to attracting and retaining teachers. The dimensions surveyed were the following: salary, benefits, incentives, retirement plans, and district reputation.

These dimensions were surveyed because the literature identifies five key factors important to teacher recruitment and retention; they include compensation, benefits, incentives, retirement plans, and district reputation (Clotfelter and Ladd, 1996). In the survey, salary was operationally defined as one’s annual compensation, and benefits were operationally defined as monthly cost relating to medical, dental, and vision care. Retirement plans were defined as the taxable amount of money one was allowed to invest. District reputation was defined as the quality of supervisors, the degree of autonomy, and the challenge of the job.

Each dimension was analyzed using descriptive statistics and Pearson’s Correlation. Correlation coefficients were interpreted as significant at a .05 significance level. In order to be accepted, each coefficient had to have a minimal strength level of plus or minus .75. With a minimal strength level of .75, the coefficient of determination would explain over half the variance between variables (56.25%).

The importance of means and standard deviation for each group is presented below in Table 1. These results show trends between groups on each independent variable. For example, the salary dimension shows that the younger, less experienced teachers value money more than the experienced teachers and there seems to be less variance within the younger, less experience groups. The benefit dimension demonstrates a distinct division between the four groups. The older groups considered benefits more important than the younger groups.

Likewise, the incentive domain suggests that the more experienced teachers prefer incentives compared to the less experienced teachers. The retirement plans dimension demonstrates the importance of retirement for the more experienced groups. Finally, District Reputation shows a lucid trend towards the importance of the district reputation and the experienced teacher.

Tests of correlation between significant variables are presented below. There were four hundred and forty one correlations analyzed with only six being of statistical significance and having the correlational strength to fit the acceptable criterion. Results revealed the following significant relationship:

. college senior salary importance and college senior benefits importance (r = -0.873. p. < .05),

. college senior salary importance and seven plus years teaching experience’s importance of district reputation (r = 0.764. p. <.05),

. one to three years teaching experience’s salary importance and one to three years teaching experience’s benefits importance (r = -0.802. p. <.05),

. four to seven years teaching experience’s salary importance and college senior salary importance (r = -0.773. p. <.05),

. seven plus years teaching experience’s district reputation importance and seven plus years teaching experience’s salary importance (r = -0.753. p. <.05), and

. seven plus years teaching experience’s retirement plan importance and four to seven years experience’s district reputation importance (r = 0.943. p. <.05).

Table 3. Test of Correlation between Significant Variables

i. The negative correlation between college senior salary importance and college senior benefits importance suggest a moderately strong inverse relationship. This relationship implies that as college seniors place more value on salaries, less value is placed on benefits.

ii. The positive correlation between seven plus years teaching experience district reputation importance and college senior salary importance suggests a moderately strong directional relationship. This relationship suggests that as the more experienced teachers valued the district reputation, the college seniors valued compensation.

iii. The strong negative correlation between one to three years teaching experience salary importance and one to three years teaching experience benefits importance suggest that as the importance of salary rises the need for benefits decreases. This supports the earlier finding that salary is extremely important for less experienced teachers, even more so than benefits.

iv. The negative correlation between four to seven years teaching experience salary importance and college senior salary importance suggests that as teachers become more experienced, compensation is not one of the most important aspects of their job.

v. The negative correlation between seven plus years teaching experience district reputation importance and seven plus years teaching experience salary importance suggest that as teachers’ experience increases, the importance of salary decreases. Thus, as teachers become more experienced, the value of other intangibles outweighs the importance of money.

vi. The strong positive correlation between seven plus years teaching experience retirement plans importance and four to seven years teaching experience district reputation importance reiterates the importance of retirement plans and the district reputation for more experienced teachers, as opposed to compensation.

The implication of these finding suggests groups of teachers are distinguished by their years of experience. For the less experienced group, findings suggest that compensation is important and benefits are not as importance. On the contrary, as teachers become more experienced, it seems that compensation is not as important as benefits. Furthermore, it seems that the experienced teacher may prefer more incentives such as bonuses for class performance, free memberships to gyms, and discounts on daycares. Experienced teachers prefer stronger retirement plans, and the district reputation is a strong factor for retaining and attracting this group.

Several scholars indicate that autonomy is rewarding to individuals in the workplace. Feguson and Ladd (1996) suggested that Locus of Control Theory indicates that individuals will be more motivated when they perceive greater internal control than when they discern only external control. This theory is similar in concept to the empowerment strategies now prevalent in the public administration literature. This theory contends that more administrators and larger bureaucracies will limit the perceived internal control of teachers and cause dissatisfaction.

In addition, the relative difficulty of teaching varies with the number of students a teacher is required to teach. Increased class size not only reduces personal contact between the teacher and student but also makes maintaining class discipline more difficult. As structural impediments make teaching more complicated, teachers are likely to be less satisfied with the teaching environment and with the job in general. These phenomena may explain why retirement plans, district reputation, and incentives were more important to the experienced teacher. Experienced teachers are aware of the insufficiencies in the public school system; if given an opportunity to decide on the best working environment, they are knowledgeable enough to understand the importance of retirement plans, district reputation, and incentives. On the contrary, less experienced and less knowledgeable teachers are more focused on the district’s compensation structure.

In summary, Texas school districts must find more creative ways to recruit the number of college-bound students who train to become teachers. Then a way must be found to keep qualified teachers from leaving their vocation for jobs outside of education. The survey results are aligned with the literature which when Hauenstein (1999) compared three similar employee surveys, since World War II, he too found that compensation is more important to younger workers than they are to older workers. Thus, there are two profiles of teachers: seasoned teachers and novice teachers.

Providing more compensation only satisfies one group. Acknowledging that there are two pools of candidates and providing greater flexibility to principals, because the current system largely ties their hands, when it comes to recruiting and rewarding qualified teachers may alleviate the turnover problem. The implementation of No Child Left Behind has added greater accountability demands on principals to raise student achievement and ensure schools are staffed with highly qualified teachers. In order to meet the deadline by 2006, I recommend that policies be revamped to give principals the same tools as managers in corporate environments, including greater flexibility and control over teachers’ compensation, benefits, recruitment, and incentives programs. The move toward more performance-based accountability is a positive one but will only work if it is accompanied by an increase in the professional authority of principals (Gould, Jewell , 1997). Even in an environment of greater autonomy for principals, such as site based management, it may well be that some recruit primarily from the ranks of traditionally certified teachers, but because of shortages in poor communities, special education, bilingual education, science, math, and added the demands of increased school accountability, they should have a choice (Kaplan & Owings, 2002).

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Copyright ©2002 Dwane Allen. About the author