Mohammad Shehzad

Major General Vinod Saighal retired from the Indian Army in 1995 from the post of Director General of Military Training. He has held assignments with UN peacekeeping forces as well as tenures in the Middle East. He served as the country's Military Attache in France and BENELUX. Currently, he is the Executive Director of Eco Monitors Society, an NGO concerned with demography and ecology.

After retirement, he founded the movement for restoration of good government. He has published articles on a vast range of subjects in almost all the leading national dailies of India, and is the author of Restructuring South Asian Security and Third Millennium Equipoise.

His latest book Restructuring Pakistan (Manas Publications, New Delhi) projects Pakistan as a terrorism sponsoring state, in which he has presented a blueprint for the resurgence of Pakistan as a dynamic and responsible member of the comity of nations.

In an interview with Political Economy, Saigal talked at length about his controversial ideas pertaining to Pakistan.

Question: Restructuring Pakistan has only negative things about Pakistan. Does it mean that you have a strong bias against Pakistan?

No. I have never been to Pakistan after partition, unless you take a short visit to Bara Pind in Shakargarh after the 1971 war as a visit to Pakistan. My regiment, The Poona Horse (given the title of Fakhre Hind by the Pakistanis after the 1965 war) happened to be there till the pull back. But I was born in Pakistan (undivided India) and lived there till partition. My family belonged to Pind Dadan Khan, Jhelum district.

Question: What was your image of Pakistan when you were in the military academy as a cadet? What is your image of Pakistan now, as a scholar?

When I was in the National Defense Academy at Kharakvasla (near Poona) in the second half of the 1950s, we did not think of Pakistan as an enemy nation. I think there was bewilderment at the enormity of the tragedy that had taken place when the Sub Continent was sundered.

Many, if not most people, felt that the two countries would yet live together in harmony, having learned the lessons from the horrendous carnage at the time of partition. There were too many personal bonds, fond memories from the other side of what then appeared to be an artificial divide. In the armies of the two countries there existed deep camaraderie between people who had fought together in WWII battles in so many far away places around the world.

And now, it is with sadness in my heart that I have to say that many people today regard Pakistan as the enemy. Till Kargil happened most Indians still felt that a younger brother had gone astray. After Kargil the familial sentiment is practically dead in Indian hearts.

Question: Restructuring Pakistan has only negative things about Pakistan. Does it mean that you have a strong bias against Pakistan?

I do not. I can never have a strong personal bias against a land where my forefathers lived for centuries, if not since time immemorial. Through the turbulent history of North Western India and areas now forming Afghanistan these ancestors with their kinsmen must have shed the same blood, tears and sweat as their descendants do now. Do not forget that Panini's grammar (of Sanskrit) was written on the banks of the Kabul River.

Half a lifetime, even a full lifetime cannot erase the millennial imprint. You say that my book has only negative things about Pakistan. A reader would find it difficult to pinpoint those negative things. There is an easy reality check that can be applied. Please randomly pick up the leading newspapers in Pakistan on most days of the year. See what the majority of the papers have to say about the dispensation that runs Pakistan and the degree of comfort that people of Pakistan derive from the direction in which the country is headed. Thereafter, apply the same test about news items relating to Pakistan in leading newspapers around the world, including the Muslim countries that Pakistan considers to be its close friends.

No. There is nothing that I have written that has strayed from the ground reality. Pakistanis who have read the book and reverted to me have conceded that they found the book thought provoking. If people in Pakistan were to read it with an open mind, casting aside an (understandable) inbuilt prejudice that the book written by an Indian general ipso facto has to be biased, they will find that it reflects some of their deepest sentiments and anxieties related to what is happening in Pakistan.

Not many people seem to be happy with the state of affairs and the entrenched system that is propelling Pakistan in directions that neither augur well for Pakistan nor for the Sub Continent, nor for that matter the rest of the world. Pakistanis should have been shell-shocked when a statement was made that, "Pakistan could be next". That statement did not emanate from Washington or London. It was attributed to the President of Pakistan. I believe the (erroneous) impression of negativity might, to an extent, be conveyed by the title of the book. There is a story behind it. The original title selected by me was Resurgence of Pakistan in the 21st Century. Please read the blurb on the dust jacket and the preface. My publisher had the last word. He changed the title.

Question: How can Indo-Pak relations be improved? Is your book a help or a hindrance to achieve this objective?

Almost immediately after retiring from the Indian Army when I started writing, one of my earliest articles entitled, "A Farewell to Arms" appeared in the Indian Express (29 June 1995). The very first sentence read, "Another war between India and Pakistan would be physical suicide for Pakistan, economic suicide for India, and a catastrophe for the Sub Continent". Since then I have been making that statement at every forum where I have been invited to speak. The ordinary people of India and Pakistan have realized the truth of that statement. The military hierarchy in Pakistan will be relegated to the barracks should they allow that sentiment to intrude. With the prevailing conditions in the world, especially after 9/11 and now Iraq, there is absolutely nothing left to fight about. Indo-Pak relations not only can improve, they have to improve.

Pakistan's policies have led to NATO sitting on its flanks in Afghanistan. Bagram will remain a US military base till the proverbial cows come home. Other US military bases in and around Pakistan have come up. With only slight hyperbole it can be said that there are perhaps as many FBI agents operating in Pakistan as in stateside USA. Pakistan's making up with India becomes a survival imperative for Pakistan. Pakistani civil society has begun to comprehend the enormity of the dangers facing Pakistan from the situation that the military hierarchy has allowed to develop in the region. Should they be able to force their masters (never friends) to change course Pakistan and India will yet find their collective way out of the woods. If not, Pakistan must await the inevitable collapse. It has nothing to do with Kashmir in the year 2003. It has everything to do with the military hierarchy not wanting to give up power after having ruled the roost for over fifty years.

As to my book, it is certainly not a hindrance. It is an eye-opener. People must read it and decide for themselves.

Question: You seem to have expressed a fear that Pakistan will sooner or later be hijacked by the ultra-radical forces. In some circles in Pakistan, the belief is, India has already been hijacked by the fundamentalist Hindus!

It is a perception that might not be correct. India can never go overboard in this regard. India has resilience on account of the fact that democracy has become deeply embedded. It acts as a corrective to all forms of excesses from time to time. The Judiciary and the Press are fiercely independent. The armed forces remain apolitical, perhaps more so than most other countries, even democracies. Recall that after the Emergency, Indira Gandhi's Congress Party was booted out. Yet the same electorate brought her back to power when the other parties proved that they were not doing a good job. More recently, the Hindutva card might have carried the day in Gujarat. It didn't help at all in Himachal Pradesh where the electorate is predominantly Hindu and deeply religious. Additionally, in India the Press continues to incessantly flagellate any deviation from the norm.

Pakistan has to allow real democracy to come in at the earliest. More importantly, it has to allow it to mature. The ideal of democracy, or even a workable, reasonably satisfactory system requires time and patience to set in.

Question: Your government and you accuse Pakistan of masterminding infiltration into Indian-administered Kashmir. Many of us here in Pakistan are unable to understand why can't India accept the proposal of deploying international monitors on both sides of the LoC?

I don't think that if they thought through the implications, even the Pakistani civil society would be very comfortable with the proposal. As opposed to India, the Pakistani civil society is hardly ever allowed to seriously debate issues that could affect them in a major way. They are simply sent out as ukases by the powers that be and everybody falls into line. Are not enough foreign military personnel already sitting on Pakistani heads? What force levels do the Pakistanis have in mind for effective monitoring by foreigners on their Eastern flank in Kashmir as well? Those are the lesser issues. The more important concern is that should all bilateral issues between the two nations of the Sub Continent be referred to third parties?

Remember, Pakistan got the best bargain--undreamed of one-sided concessions--from the Simla Agreement, from the 'bilateral' negotiations between the two countries. People now say that the wily Zulfikar Ali Bhutto got the better of Indira Gandhi at Simla, when she held all the cards. Indira Gandhi, perhaps the strongest prime minister that India has had, was well versed in the art of real politik. Although the impression lingers, she was hardly outsmarted by Bhutto. She did not want Pakistan to disintegrate further as might have been the case if Bhutto had gone back empty-handed. He said so in as many words.

India had neither the desire nor the capacity to fill the vacuum that would have been thereby created. Outside powers would have done so. Perhaps there was a lingering hope in her mind--naive by hindsight--that after having lost the 1971 war and suffered a major reverse Pakistan would at last be ready to live in peace with India. She tried to give peace a chance. So did Prime Minister Vajpayee--at Lahore and then again at Agra.

Question: Is Kashmir amenable to any solution acceptable to both India and Pakistan?

Yes. Perhaps to begin with both sides should accept the LoC as the start point for negotiating a permanent settlement.

Question: India says it is willing to talk to Pakistan but in the same breath insists that Kashmir is the integral part of India. Where is the common ground?

Legally, India's case rests on strong foundations. It is not likely to change its position on the basics. What could change is the realisation that continued confrontation between the two neighbours could harm both countries more severely than before in the altered global reality, especially if weapons of mass destruction were to fall into wrong hands. Hence, it might have to explore various avenues to arrive at a situation that brings much needed peace to the two countries. As I have mentioned in my book, the tragedy of Afghanistan could not have been visited upon the hapless people of that country if India and Pakistan had not been warring with each other for fifty years without let up.

Question: As an army general, what strengths and weaknesses do you see in the Pakistan army?

The Pakistan army is a highly professional force. However, governance and military professionalism do not always go together; prolonged activity in domains other than its primary field cannot enhance professionalism. To what extent it has been diminished by frequent takeovers can only be guessed at by outsiders. There is another aspect that should cause deep anxiety to the people of Pakistan. It relates to promotions and transfers. General Musharraf--for reasons that should not be difficult to fathom--would continue to ensure that loyalty to him remains the overriding criterion for promotion to higher ranks and for key postings. His life may depend upon it. What may be good for General Musharraf need not always be good for Pakistan, at least not to the same extent.

In all fairness to the Pakistani head of state it must be conceded that fiddling with promotions and postings for ensuring personal loyalty is not peculiar to the present incumbent. Many of his illustrious predecessors had done the same. It has been and will remain true of all dictators, anywhere in the world. By the same token, the primary impulse of a dictator is to retain power, regardless of cost--to the nation or to any other person or entity. In the process, to ensure that the growing disparity between self-interest and the national interest does not become glaringly apparent to the public, the national interest is subtly remoulded in a manner that it appears to coincide with the dictator's interest.

Question: What, in your view, went wrong at Agra Summit considering the claim of Pakistan that it was prepared to discuss terrorism and other sensitive subjects like nuclear safeguards at the highest level?

Why Agra failed? From the Indian side: insufficient preparation; absence of an agreed agenda; lack of preparatory groundwork at working or intermediate levels, which should be de rigeur for path-breaking historic accords; initial over-expansiveness on the part of the Indian Prime Minister, possibly without detailed discussion with all his cabinet colleagues; inability to read the new Pakistani President's mind prior to and even during the visit; the organisers did not keep a firm grip on the conference; too much media glare; venue not well chosen; possible differences in perception.

From the Pakistani side: failure to appreciate the sincerity of the Indian Prime Minister and the lengths to which he had gone to try and accommodate the Pakistani President; Vajpayee understood General Musharraf's predicament, his offer of talks was genuine, the concessions that he was ready to make could hardly have been made by any other Indian leader; a golden opportunity, which a seasoned politician would have grasped with both hands, was lost to Pakistan

What was uppermost in the mind of the Pakistani President, having just anointed himself as the head of state, was to use the occasion to establish his legitimacy in the eyes of his countrymen, his Indian counterparts and the world. He was keen to show that he was more than a match for the Indians. He succeeded admirably. Pervez Musharraf won the media battle hands down. Pakistan lost the prize that could have fallen in its lap.

If an able statesman--as opposed to a mercurial general--had come to India for the Agra summit he could have walked away with many concessions, as Prime Minister Vajpayee seemed to be in a frame of mind to break the impasse. His health at that time was not good. He had an eye on history. His colleagues might even have felt that the concessions being offered were one-sided. General Musharraf was playing to the gallery, enjoying himself hugely--during Agra and on his return to Pakistan. In the process he missed several nuances that could only have been picked up by a very seasoned diplomat.

Question: What is your reaction to Sinha's statement that Pakistan is a fit case for Bush doctrine?

Foreign Minister Sinha is not given to making off-the-cuff remarks. He was possibly signaling to Pakistan that perhaps it was again raising the ante to very dangerous levels. In any case, the Indian press was hardly amused by his statement.

Question: How does the doctrine of pre-emption reconcile with the resolution of Indian parliament deploring the US/UK attack on Iraq?

It doesn't.

Question: From January 2002, all links between India and Pakistan barring the presence of diplomatic missions are cut off. How has this helped the objective of India?

It has not helped.

Copyright ©2002 Mohammad Shehzad and The News on Sunday. About the author