Revival of Pak-US Defense Ties: A Double-edged Sword?
Mohammad Shehzad
United States has revived the Pak-US Defense Consultative Group (DCG), which had been suspended since 1998 in the aftermath of Pakistan's nuclear tests. A 40-member US delegation, led by the Under Secretary of Defense (Policy) Douglas J Feith, visited Islamabad on 26th September 2002, to effect the resumption of defense ties.
The military government considered itself a key ally in the US-led war against terror. Therefore, its expectations were great. It, at least, wanted more F-16s and other sophisticated aircrafts, state-of-the-art naval hardware, and an upgraded radar system to counter Israel's supply of advanced Falcon AWACS (airborne warning and control system) aircraft to India. But it had to face tremendous disappointment when it got nothing except some vague promises by the US government to supply spare parts and greater co-operation in military training and intelligence.
In 1980, Pakistan bought two dozen F-16 aircrafts and paid US full amount in advance, but the delivery was withheld because of Islamabad's nuclear weapons programme. Pakistan, today, badly needs spare parts for its 40 F-16s. About 30 are serviceable. Therefore, the revival of DCG is the case of Hobson's choice for Pakistan.
What Pakistan will get out of the deal will literally be a pittance, but Musharraf regime is bending over backwards to prove that Pak-US relations have entered a golden era. The US has changed its inimical policies towards Pakistan. In lieu of its meritorious services in the war against terror, the US will restore the arms sale. This is a miracle that a civilian government could never have performed.
The state-owned TV calls it a new era of defense ties that would give Pakistan a credible deterrence against India. It would strengthen the Pak-US relations between the two countries and lead to stability in the region. The ground reality is described by the editorial of Daily Times (28 September 2002).
"...Departments of Defense and State have cleared a list of 21 weapons systems that manufacturers can sell to India. Earlier this year, the US struck a US$140m deal with India for eight weapon-locating radars (Fire Finders) and its support and sub-systems. This is the biggest such sale from the US in the last thirty years.
Additionally, the US has approved Israeli sales to India of different weapon systems and sub-systems, including the highly sophisticated Phalcon AWACS. These sales will evidently enhance India's already superior conventional capability. By increasing the asymmetry, this could lead to a lowering of the nuclear threshold, which, given the nature of the conflict-prone relations between India and Pakistan, can only be dangerous."
What could be the ramifications of this renewed "love-and-hate" affair between the US and Pakistan? This scribe met some independent analysts and came up with the following update:
Lt General (retd) Talat Masood, former chairman Pakistan Ordnance Factory, views the DCG positively. "By taking this step, the US has institutionalised its relations with the military regime and also helped its defense industry," he said. "The US will give you what enables you to maintain the existing stockpile. It may eventually release F-16 spare parts. It could take you years to get major weapons. That would require more trust and a better South Asia."
But would it be in the interest of Pakistan? "You want it or not, that is the question," he replied. "The army wants it. Pakistan will have a better understanding with the Pentagon. We could have joint training exercises with the US. We could encounter the Indian belligerency and save ourselves from isolation. Though, it won't earn us parity with India, but at least put us in a 1-3 proportion, which is enough to stop India."
Could Pakistan be betrayed again? "Pakistan is very conscious about it. It depends more on China now. Only a few things come from the US," opined Masood. Could the new "romance" between Washington and Islamabad make China jealous? "Good relations with the US have never been at the expense of ties with China. Sino-US relations are good despite a number of differences. In fact, the US has improved it relations with Pakistan, India and China to augment its presence in the region," he observed.
Dr Shirin Mazari, head of the Institute of Strategic Studies, was of the view that the DCG, in principle, was a good thing. It was good for Pakistan to gain military and strategic benefit. But the quid pro quo should be transparent. If the US gave India some state-of-the-art weapons, then we should be sure that we did not become a dumpsite of their outdated weapons.
Emphasising the 'historical experience', Dr Mazari warned: "We must not misinterpret the US intentions. It was not always the US betrayal but our own misguided euphoria that caused us problem. Pacts like Cento and Seato were against communism, and could not have been used in terms of defense against India."
Admiral (retd) Faseih Bokhari resigned from the office of the Naval Chief on 5 October 1999, because he had got wind of Musharraf's plan of toppling Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif's government to avoid a court marshal for masterminding the Kargil operation. In his controversial remarks, he said:
"The Indians are not our enemy. Ask a farmer in Maharashtar to fight Pakistan. He won't budge. The US role in the Middle East and South Asia is determined by the needs of its people, not by the needs of the regions. The US need is cheap hydrocarbon resources of the Gulf and Caspian region and markets for the expensive products of its military industrial complex. This requires threats to be created within the region to justify heavy military sales and dividing countries of the region to secure the resources. The US aligns itself with the major power centers--be it Arab Sheikhs or dictators like Musharraf. Our army has always been pro-US.
"Security paradigm requires us to open up borders for trade with neighbours, which we can't do because we are told that India is enemy, Iran is hostile, and Afghanistan is pro-Russia. The interest of South Asia lies in jointly denying the US fleet ingress to the North Arabian Sea. The resources of the Gulf and Caspian are equally the rights of the people of South Asia. If the US is really looking at the interests of the South Asians, it should build up our naval fleet, which it does not. It would build up the land forces of Pakistan because they are no threats to the US interests."
Pakistan's establishment firmly believes that it was the US stick that refrained India from attacking Pakistan. If we buy this argument, it would mean that the US is strong enough to boss around India. If the US really wants a peaceful world--free of terrorism, drugs and other evils--then why can it not use its influence for de-weaponisation and de-nuclearisation of the world? To show good intentions, why does it not destroy all its weapons of mass destruction before accusing Iraq of manufacturing such weapons?
Peace and stability in South Asia is in the interest of the US. Why is the US selling arms to both India and Pakistan, telling each individually that one is the enemy of the other? Why is the US playing a dirty game of "divide and rule", which the British played for a long time and finally gave up on it? Why is the ruling clique of Pakistan and the Indian leadership unable to understand that the US is nobody's friend, and both the countries are the victims of its dangerous politics?
India and Pakistan have so much in common in every respect that they are the two wheels of a bicycle. They need to move in one direction if they have to reach a destination. The region will be stable only if these two countries sign treaties of love, peace, trust and sincerity. It is time to recognise as to who is the real enemy and who is benefiting from our enmity. Do the people of these two countries need more arms or clean drinking water, food, education and health facilities? Is territorial security more important than human security?
The DCG is just another bait--a double-edged sword that will rip the poor masses of India and Pakistan. The revival or suspension of DCG or any other pact solely depends on the US will and pleasure. The US suspended it unilaterally, and revived it in the same manner. Pakistan never had any choice or the courage to say 'no' to the US.
Chronology of US-Pak Relations
. 1950: Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan turns down Moscow's invitation and visits the US to give an impression: "We can do business with Washington."
. 1954: Pakistan joins SEATO and CENTO
. May 1954: Pak-US sign Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement. US boosts economic and military aid to Pakistan.
. February 1955: Pakistan joins the Baghdad Pact. US acts as the Pact's major element, without ever joining the alliance formally.
. 1959: Pakistan allows the US to establish secret intelligence facility and flights over Soviet Union.
. March 1959: Pak-US sign bilateral security agreement, which called upon the US to take such appropriate action, including the use of armed forces as may be mutually agreed upon. The commitment was, however, restricted to instances of communist aggression.
. 1960: The U-2 episode brings home to Pakistan that besides military and economic aid, alignment with the US also entailed risks and dangers.
. January 1961: The new Kennedy administration boosts assistance to India to $1bn annually, and pledges only $150 million for Pakistan.
. July 1961: Ayub Khan visits the US and stresses Pakistan's reliability as an ally.
. 1964: President Johnson conveys his distress over Pakistan's attention to China.
. April 1965: Johnson imposes a de facto freeze on aid to Pakistan and India.
. September 1965: US suspends military and economic aid to Pakistan following war with India.
. 1966-7: Johnson approves $140m of commodity aid to Pakistan. Allows sale of spare parts for US-supplied equipment, but refuses to provide financial credit or military assistance. Accepts a more passive role in the competition with the Soviet Union and China for influence in the region.
. [There was a fundamental shift in the US policy by the end of the decade following the failure by the US to limit Pak-Sino relations. Pakistan feels betrayed by its 'friend'. When Pres Johnson left office in January 1969, the alliance was over in all but name. Although, Washington continued to provide substantial economic assistance, military supply relationship was drastically restricted.]
. 14 July 1971: Kissinger pays a secret visit to China through Pakistan.
. 15 July 1971: US suspends Pak aid.
. March 1973: Nixon restores the 1967 arms supply policy and releases $24m worth military equipment.
. May 1974: Following India's "peaceful nuclear explosion", Z A Bhutto pledges to press ahead with Pakistan's nuclear programme.
. February 1975: President Ford lifts all limitations on arms transfers to Pakistan and India ending the embargo imposed by Johnson ten years ago. US Congress adopts amendments to Section 669 and 670 of the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) proposed by Senator Johan Glenn and Stuart Symington. Kissinger threatens to make a horrible example of Bhutto if he pursues nuclear programme.
. September 1977: President Carter imposes sanctions on Pakistan under the Glenn Amendment.
. January 1979: Pakistan withdraws from CENTO.
. April 1979: US again suspends aid to Pakistan under the Symington Amendment because of the latter's refusal to give up its nuclear programme.
. July 1979: Carter approves small covert-assistance programme for Afghans opposing the communist government in Kabul.
. November 1979: US Embassy Islamabad is set on fire.
. December 1979: Soviets invade Afghanistan. Carter reaffirms the 1959 bilateral security agreement against communist aggression. Offers to renew aid to Pakistan, and expand covert assistance for Afghanistan to include all levels of military support for the Afghan Mujahideen.
. 1981: Reagan gets approval for waiver of sanctions on Pakistan. Offers $3.2bn five-year aid proposal equally divided between economic and military aid, including F-16 aircraft.
. September 1984: Pakistan's nuclear programme arouses Congressional suspicions as Reagan administration gears to seek approval for a second multi-year military and economic package for Pakistan worth $4.0bn. Congress approves the Pressler Amendment requiring annual certification by the President that Pakistan does not possess a nuclear device, before aid to Pakistan could be approved. The Reagan administration also accepts the Solarz Amendment to the FAA, barring aid to governments illegally importing nuclear technology.
. October 1986: Reagan certifies for the first time that Pakistan does not possess a nuclear device.
. December 1987:Despite reports that Pakistan was only two screwdriver turns away from possessing a nuclear device, Reagan issues the required Pressler certification for the second time, citing US national security interests.
. 1989: Bush becomes President. Soviets withdraw from Afghanistan.
. 1990: Uprising in Kashmir worries US of a nuclear exchange between India and Pakistan.
. October 1990: Bush invokes Pressler Amendment. Freezes $564m economic and military aid approved for 1991. Asks Pakistan to cap, roll back and eliminate its nuclear programme, and blocks delivery of F-16s. Pakistan refuses to roll back its nuclear programme.
. 1991: US effectively washes its hands off Afghanistan. Accuses China of providing Pakistan with medium-range M-11 missile launchers. Imposes sanctions under MTCR on Pakistan and China.
. 1993: Clinton warns Pakistan that it stood on the brink of being included in the terrorist watch list for harbouring Islamic extremists. Enforces Pressler sanctions.
. March 1994: Clinton asks Pakistan to accept "non-intrusive" verification of its nuclear programme in exchange for release of F-16s. Pakistan refuses to bargain. Senator Brown proposes easing of sanctions.
. September 1995: Clinton approves resumption of economic assistance under the Brown Amendment.
. March 1996: Clinton moves to implement Brown Amendment and permit one-time release of $386m in assistance and transfers of military equipment and technology to Pakistan.
. May 1998: US imposes sanctions on Pakistan and India following nuclear tests.
. December 1998: Pak-US resolve the F-16 issue.
. 1999: Clinton promises to seek lifting of all sanctions, including the Pressler Amendment, if Pakistan agrees to sign CTBT, stop missile co-operation, participate in multilateral negotiation to ban production of fissile material, and put in place comprehensive nuclear export-control regime.
. July 1999: With US nudging, Nawaz agrees to urge Kashmiri militants to withdraw from the Line of Control.
. October 2001: Bush Jr orders air strikes on Afghanistan following the September 11 attacks. Afghanistan becomes a major focus of US military and political attention in relations with Pakistan in the middle of US war against terrorism.
Source: Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad, Pakistan
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